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topic of my paper
“The Right to Persons Akin to Rights to Things” is 
introduced in the Rechtslehre in order to legitimate 
family relationships. 
In fact, according to Kant, family relationships neither 
can be equated to relations with things, nor are merely 
contractual.
But why?
1. The “Rights to Persons Akin to Rights to Things”
outline of my presentation




3. The implications of family right in Kant’s political 
philosophy - 
and: 
what can it suggest for nowadays issues?
This right is that of possession of an external object as a 
thing and use of it as a person. -  What is mine or yours 
in terms of this right is what is mine or yours 
domestically, and the relation of persons in the domestic 
condition is that of a community of free beings who form a 
society of members of a whole called a household (of 
persons standing in community with one another) by their 
affecting one another in accordance with the principle of 
outer freedom (causality). - Acquisition of this status, 
and within it, therefore takes place neither by a deed on 
one's own initiative (facto) nor by a contract (pacto) 
alone but by law (lege); for, since this kind of right is 
neither a right to a thing nor merely a right against a 
person but also possession of a person, it must be a right 
lying beyond any rights of humanity in our own person, from 
which there follows a natural permissive law 
[Erlaubnisgesetzt], by the favor of which this sort of 
acquisition is possible for us”. (MdS, 6:276)
1. Definition: Rechtslehre, § 22
“
“
2. object of the new claim is neither an object nor a service but the 
condition of a person (§4)
“Rights to Persons Akin 
to Rights to Things”
1. “possession of an external object as a thing and use of it 
as a person.”
Moreover:
3. the structure of the family right is innovative (§23): the marriage assumes a 
logical preminence. 
“Sexual union (commercium sexuale) is the reciprocal use 
that one human being makes of the sexual organs and 
capacities of another (usus membrorum et facultatum 
sexualis alterius). 
....
Sexual union in accordance with law is marriage 
(matrimonium), that is, the union of two persons of 
different sexes for lifelong possession of each other’s 
sexual attributes.
....
– The end of begetting and bringing up children may be 
an end of nature, for which it implanted the 
inclinations of the sexes for each other; but it is not 
requisite for human beings who marry to make this their 
end in order for their union to be compatible with this 
right, for otherwise marriage would be dissolved when 
procreation ceases” (MdS 6: 277)
2a. Marriage Right




For the natural use that one sex makes of the other's 
sexual organs is enjoyment, for which one gives 
itself up to the other. In this act a human being 
makes himself a thing, which conflicts with the right 
of humanity in his own person. (MdS, 6:278)
the Verdingung problem
NB. As far as I know, only a few scholars underlined this aspect of Kantian 
family right. See  in particular B. Herman, C. MacKinnon (cited in the paper).
“
“
1. Reciprocity. While one of the two persons abandons themselves to the 
other and in doing so places themselves at disposal just as they were a thing, 
the other in turn takes completely this person, who at the same time 
experiences an equal process of loss and acquisition of their own personality.  
Reciprocity is a necessary, but not sufficient condition in order to 
solve the moral problem.
Kant’s solution
2. Marriage. Stemming from the obligation of not setting up a sexual union 
but by means of marriage, the domestic society begins as a civil community 
that, as a socially crucial institution, acknowledges to the man and the woman 
the juridical (thus moral) subjectivity, since it can compensate for reciprocal 
deficiencies and faults. This condition is sufficient to amend the 
immorality of the act.
“the relation of the partners in a marriage is a 
relation of equality of possession [Gleichheit des 
Besitzes], equality both in their possession of each 
other as persons (hence only in monogamy, since in 
polygamy the person who surrenders herself gains only a 
part of the man who gets her completely, and therefore 
makes herself into a mere thing), and also equality in 
their possession of material goods. As for these, the 
partners are still authorized to forgo the use of a 





“Just as there arose from one’s duty to oneself, that 
is, to the humanity in one’s own person, a right (ius 
personale) of both sexes to acquire each other as 
persons in the manner of things by marriage, so there 
follows from procreation in this community a duty to 
preserve and care for its offspring; that is, children, 
as persons, have by their procreation an original 
innate (not acquired) right to the care of their 
parents until they are able to look after themselves, 
and they have right directly by law (lege), that is, 
without any special act being required to establish 




“From this duty there must necessarily also arise 
the right of parents to manage and develop the 
chils, as long as he has not yet mastered the use of 
his members or his understanding: the right not only 
to feed and care for him but to educate him, to 
develop him both pragmatically, so that in the 
future he can look after himself and make his way in 
life, and morally, since otherwise the fault for 
having neglected him would fall on the parents. They 
have the right to do all this until the time of his 
emancipation (emancipatio), when they renounce their 
parental right to direct him as well as any claim to 
be compensated for their support and pains up till 




“For the offspring is a person, and it is impossible to 
form a concept of the production of a being endowed with 
freedom through a physical operation*. So from a 
practical point of view it is a quite correct and even 
necessary idea to regard the act of procreation as one 
by which we have brought a person into the world without 
its consent and on our own initiative, for which deed 
the parent incur an obligation to make their child 
content with his condition so far as they can. - They 
cannot destroy their child as if he were something they 
had made (since a being endowed with freedom cannot be a 
product of this kind) or as if he were their property, 
nor can they even abandon him to chance, since they have 
brought not merely a wordly being [Weltwesen] but a 
citizen of the world [Weltbürger] into a condition which 
cannot now be indifferent to them even just according to 
concepts of right”. (MdS, 6: 280-281)  
the child as a Weltbürger
“
“
3. Care-relations must be legally recognized; here, again, the necessity 
of the new claim of acquisition is justified.
2c. Family right
1. The world family appears only in § 30, referring to the relation 
between the child and his parents. 
2. How children obtain independence from their parents?
It is possible to draw several inferences regarding the structure of oikos and 
the position of the domestic society within the polis and the cosmopolis.
According to Kant, the oikonomìa, strictly intended, is based on three 
fundamental facts: sexual union (between a man and a woman), procreation 
and care relations (among family members and servants).
Under which conditions may these moments and relationships, reifying in 
themselves, turn to be moral relations?
The answer is the new claim of acquisition, that introduces a system of rights 
and duties aimed at ensuring freedom and equality to the subjects involved.
The domestic society thus emerges as a midget republic, subjected to the 
laws of the State .
a synthesis
By considering the right to the cosmopolitical citizenship an innate 
attribute of the human being, the Rechtslehre thus attends to 
outlining the conditions of possibility starting from the first human 
associative form, the family, through the State, to the world republic. 
If the institution of an authority which is generally acknowledged in 
every spot of the world, that may and must be always controlled by 
the public debate and by a side-taking of its citizens, is a condition of 
peace in the world, in the Rechtslehre the extension of the a priori 
principles of the Right to the domestic society, the first school of 
morality hosting the world citizen, turns out to be another essential 
condition in order to achieve the final end, that is peace. 
conclusions
Why is interesting to 
discuss about all this 
today?
b. Juridically
The validity of 
a Kantian approach
a. From a logical and philosophical point of view
c. From a political point of view
Which moments and relationships are reifying in themselves and need to be 
turned into moral relations? Is the Kantian analysis still sufficient? 
Accepting Kant’s methodology, it is possible to apply his solution to all the 
relationships which:
a. are based on sexual intercourse (not necessarily only heterosexual);
b. are centered on care relations (such as the PActe civil de solidarité (PACS) 
in France).
put it in practice..
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